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KVANVIG NO A-THEORIST 
William Lane Craig 
Jonathan Kvam'ig's clarification of his \'iews on divine timelessness and 
omniscience makes it clear that his reconciliation of divine timeless eternity 
and divine omniscience is effected only by embracing a B-Theory of 
Language according to which there are no tensed facts to be known. 
Kvanvig thus finds himself in the company of B-theorists who hold that in 
knowing tenseless facts God knows all the facts there are about the tempo-
ral world. If one embraces a tenseless theory of time, then the "reconcilia-
tion" of timelessness and omniscience is admittedly easy. 
My response to Jonathan Kvanvig's helpful and interesting elucidation of 
his semantical theory for tensed sentences can be short and to the point: 
Kvanvig's clarification of his views makes it quite clear that his reconcilia-
tion of divine timeless eternity and divine omniscience is effected by 
embracing a B-Theory of Language according to which there are no tensed 
facts to be known, whether by God or anyone else, that is to say, there are 
no truth-variable propositions, not even those expressed by tensed sen-
tences, and knowledge has exclusively as its objects propositions which do 
not vary in their respective truth values. 
Thus, I erred in thinking that "Kvanvig holds both to the objective reali-
ty of tensed facts and to God's timeless knowledge of all facts.'" I now see 
that the first conjunct of the sentence cited is false. No doubt I was misled 
into so thinking by Kvanvig's idiosyncratic token formulation of the 
propositional content of the sentence "It is now 1 June 19R4" as 
1. It is now 1 jllnt' 1984. 
Such a token formulation is at best misleading, since the semantic value of 
the word "now" is, for Kvanvig (in contrast to Wierenga), not a tensed 
time, a constituent of an A-series, but the essence of a tenseless time in the 
B-series. The token formulation of the proposition expressed by the tensed 
sentence in question would thus be more perspicuously rendered by some-
thing like 
1.' t is 1 june 1984, 
where t is to be analyzed metaphysically as the individual essence of the 
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relevant B-series moment. By retaining indexical words in his token for-
mulations of the propositional content of tensed sentences, Kvanvig creates 
the false impression that he holds to the objective reality of tensed facts or 
to propositions which vary in truth-value in virtue of the passage of time. 
Thus, Kvanvig averts the conclusion of my original argument by deny-
ing its premiss 
4. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient, God knows 
tensed facts. 
Kvanvig is thus included in the company of B-theorists of whom I wrote, 
The B-theorist escapes this argument by denying that there are any 
tensed facts, so that (4) is false. The B-theorist holds that God knows 
all the facts there are about the temporal world in knowing tenseless 
facts. Thus, if one embraces a tenseless theory of time, he eludes the 
objector's snare.2 
I was interested in the attempts of thinkers who hold to the objective reali-
ty of tensed facts to reconcile divine omniscience with divine timelessness, 
for I freely grant that if one denies that tensed facts exist, then the "recon-
ciliation" is easy. 
That Kvanvig's theory is a B-Theory of Language scarcely needs 
demonstration. He advises that we quit talking about tensed facts, for 
"Tense is a property of sentences, not facts." He thereby makes it evident, 
not only that tense is a purely linguistic phenomenon, but also that the 
semantic value of tensed sentences does not include any metaphysical real-
ity such as the property of presentness. He affirms a theory of propositions 
which holds that "there is no such thing as a proposition that is true at one 
time and false at another .... a proposition, if true at any time, is true at all 
times." This affirmation entails that propositional content is uniformly 
tenseless, otherwise certain propositions would vary in truth value in 
vi'tue of their including the A-determinations of various moments or 
events. In conjunction with Kvanvig's affirmation that if anything "is 
something that can be known, it has to be a proposition," it also entails that 
God knows no tensed facts (indeed, there are no such things as tensed 
facts). When Kvanvig states that a theory "must delineate the constituents 
of the proposition I am tired in such a way that the proposition is true at all 
times if true at all," he must assume that the propositional constituents of 
that proposition include (the essence of) a time in the B-series, lest that 
proposition and its contradictory 1 am not tired are both true at all times. 
Sure enough, the propositional constituents of I am now tired are said to 
include, not the essence of an A-series moment, which the token formula-
tion now suggests, but "the essence of the time of utterance" which is tense-
lessly related to the essence of Jon K vanvig by the being tired relation. 
Kvanvig's seman tical theory of tensed sentences raises all sorts of ques-
tions which are interesting in their own right,' but I leave them aside in 
order to underscore the main point: his accowlt succeeds in reconciling 
divine timelessness and divine omniscience only by sacrificing the reality 
KV ANVIG NO A-THEORIST 379 
of tensed facts. 4 The question now becomes whether any such B-Theory of 
Language is tenable or plausible-Kvanvig's theory entails, for example, 
that I never know that my wife is kissing me (since objects of knowledge 
are exclusively propositions and propositions are uniformly tenseless or 
truth value-invariant), which conclusion may strike us as more than mildly 
implausible.5 
Talbot School of Theology 
NOTES 
1. William Lane Craig, "Omniscience, Tensed Facts, and Divine Eternity," 
Faith and Philosophy 17 (2000): 226. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Kvanvig's semantical theory contains a number of inconcinnities which 
need to be ironed out. For example, his claim that the propositions 
1. John runs. 
2. The semantic value of "John" in the sentence "John runs" has the property of 
running, which is the semantic value of the predicate of that same sentence. 
3. The property which is the essence of John is mutually exemplified with the 
property of running. 
are necessarily equivalent is very problematic. For (2) is plausibly taken to 
affirm that the semantic value of "John" is a concrete object, somebody named 
"John" who has the property of rulming. Such an understanding would be in 
line with the New Theory of Reference according to which propositions, like 
sets, have concrete objects among their constituents. But then Kvanvig surpris-
es by affirming that "the semantic value of 'John' is some property which is the 
essence of John", which leads to (3). But are we then to suppose, in accord 
with (2), that it is the essence of John which has the property of running? That 
is clearly absurd. Rather (3) tells us that these two properties are mutually 
exemplified. But then (2) is false, since the semantic value of "John" does not, 
after all, have the property of rwming. Furthermore, (2) cannot be equivalent 
to (1) and (3), since (2) alone entails the existence of the sentence "John runs." 
(1) and (3) have no such referent and so can be true in worlds in which no such 
sentence exists. Moreover, Kvanvig's assertion that "the tense of the sentence 
used to express the original proposition John runs is irrelevant to the question 
of the relationship between the three propositions" is problematic, for (1) is 
ostensibly a tenseless or truth value-in variant-proposition; but how can (3) be a 
tenselessly true proposition? So construing (3) would make John an etemally 
running being. Perhaps both (1) and (3) have among their metaphysical con-
stituents some time. This view is suggested by Kvanvig's proposal that the 
same proposition is expressed by the sentences "I am tired" and "I am now 
tired." But this "redundancy theory" of now fails to account for the phenome-
non known as double-indexing. (See my The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical 
Examination, Synthese Library 293 [Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2000J, pp. 11-17, 124-125.) In addition, Kvanvig analyzes the proposition 111111 
/Jow tired in terms of the ascription of the property being tired IlOW. This analysis 
faces the same sort of problem which Trenton Merricks has spotted in the solu-
tion proposed by proponents of time-indexed properties to the Problem of 
Temporary Intrinsics: rather than analyzing I am now tired in terms of the pre-
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sent inherence of the familiar property being tired in some subject, we are 
required to postulate an exotic, unanalyzable property being-tired-Ilow. (See my 
The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, Synthese Library 294 
[Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000], pp. 185-186.) Oddly, 
K vanvig then inconsistently claims that his theory proposes to analyze 1 am 
now tired in terms of a two-place relation being tired behveen Kvanvig's essence 
and the essence of the time of the utterance. Wholly apart from the difficulty 
that it is surely not Kvanvig's essence which is tired, this solution is akin to a 
Relationalist solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics and implies the 
counter-intuitive conclusion that Kvanvig has no intrinsic properties after all. 
(See my Tensebs Theory of Time, pp. 184-190.) These and other issues merit dis-
cussion which would be tangential to the main thrust of my argument here. 
4. -Unless, that is, Kvanvig were willing to affirm that tense is an onto-
logical category which, though not captured in the propositional content of 
tensed sentences, is nonetheless objectively real. Then my argument on p. 236 
of my "Omniscience, Tensed Facts, and Divine Eternity" would need to be 
taken into account. 
5. Kvanvig's theory allows us to say that the tenseless proposition Kvanvig 
kisses his wife at t has a cognitive significance for Kvanvig that involves a tensed 
belief state in virtue of the way in which he grasps the tenseless propositional 
content expressed by the tensed sentence; nonetheless, because there are no 
non-propositional facts on his account and knowledge is exclusively proposi-
tional, Kvanvig camlot know the tensed fact that he is kissing his wife. For a 
defense of the objective reality of tensed facts and a critique of various B-
Theories of Language, see my Tensed Theory of Time, Part I. 
